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A FIRST AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE IDEAl 
EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY AND COPYRIGHT IN A 
WORK'S "TOTAL CONCEPT AND FEEL" 
by 
Alfred C. Yen* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At first blush, the coexistence of the first amendment and the copyright 
lawl poses a puzzling contradiction. The first amendment provides that 
"Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of speech."2 The Su-
preme Court has often invoked this passage to prevent the suppression or 
censorship of written,3 spoken;' symbolic,!) and artistic expression.6 By 
contrast, the copyright law appears to do exactly what the first amend-
ment prohibits by forcing authors not to make unauthorized use of copy-
* B.S., M.S. Stanford University; J.D. Harvard Law School. Assistant Professor of Law, Boston 
College Law School. The author wishes to thank Dan Coquillette, Jim Rogers, and Mark Larsen for 
their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this work. The author also wishes to express his grati-
tude to research assistants John D'Amato, Tommy Shi, and Claudia Leis, and to Boston College and 
Boston College Law School for research grants. 
A draft of this Article was distributed in February 1989 to conferees at the Center for the Study of 
Law, Science and Technology Conference on Computer Software Protection, Arizona State Univer-
sity, Tempe, Arizona. 
Copyright 1989 by Alfred C. Yen. All rights reserved. 
1 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). 
• U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
3 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (press reports concerning a trial 
receive first amendment protection); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per 
curiam) (newspaper publishing "The Pentagon Papers" entitled to first amendment protection); Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (first amendment protects newspaper article charging police with 
neglect of duty). 
• See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) (defendant's shouted statements 
entitled to first amendment protection); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam) 
(defendant's verbal references to shooting the President of the United States entitled to first amend-
ment protection); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (restrictions on loudspeakers unconstitu-
tional as an infringement on free speech). 
• See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam) (taping a peace symbol to 
an upside down American flag was protected expression); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community 
School Dis!., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam war constituted 
protected expression); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (flying red flag as a symbol of 
opposition to the government was protected expression). 
• See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (defendant has right to possess obscene 
movie); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 
(1959) (first amendment protects distribution of the film Lady Chatterley's Lover). 
HeinOnline -- 38 Emory L. J.  394 1989
394 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38 
righted materia!'? To the extent that copyright dictates the manner in 
which an author may express herself, it infringes the author's freedom of 
expression.a 
In 1970, separate articles by Professors Melville Nimmer and Paul 
Goldstein identified this apparent conflict between the first amendment 
and copyright.9 However, both scholars believed that the conflict could be 
resolved. Naturally, they identified the importance of uninhibited expres-
sion as guaranteed by the first amendment.lo However, they also noted 
that copyright actually encourages speech by granting limited 'monopolies 
to authors. Without these incentives, expressive output would presumably 
decline.ll Thus, in their view, copyright's promotion of expressionI2 was 
generally consistent with the first amendment.I3 
This belief has profoundly affected the course of copyright jurispru-
dence. In particular, courts have used the general congruence between 
copyright and the first amendment to support a practice of ignoring the 
first amendment when interpreting the copyright law. Consequently, even 
when first amendment arguments have been placed directly before them, 
courts have held that no conflict exists between the first amendment and 
copyright. 14 
1 Although copyright is expressly authorized by article I of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8, the first amendment limits all powers granted in the main body of the Constitution. Thus, 
to the extent that copyright and the first amendment clash, copyright must give way. 
8 Further evidence of copyright's infringing effect comes from copyright's legal origin in cen-
sorhip. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2-9 (1967). 
9 Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 
17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 
983 (1970). See also Denicola, Copyright and Free SPeech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protec-
tion of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A 
Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 43 (1971); Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 892-93 
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 224-29 
(1968). 
I. Goldstein, sujlra note 9, at 988-90; Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1186-88. 
11 Goldstein, suJ'ra note 9, at 991 ("[W]ithdrawal of property rights will presumably be accom-
panied by a decline in the dissemination of needed expression."); Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1186 
("[C]ongressional authorization to grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright is 
predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the creative activities of authors and 
that the copyright monopoly is a necessary stimulus to the full realization of such creative activities."). 
12 The Constitution grants Congress its copyright power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
13 Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1189-93; Goldstein, supra note 9, at 990, lOOt. 
.. Schnapper v. Foley, 471 F. Supp. 426, 428 (D.D.C. 1979), ajf'd, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 
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The courts have generally supported this position by referring to a 
copyright doctrine known as the idea/expression dichotomy.1/) This di-
chotomy, which is presently embodied in Section 102(b) of the copyright 
code,t6 is perhaps the most important limit on the unwarranted expansion 
of copyright. It operates by denying protection to the ideas which underlie 
copyrightable works. Consequently, only the original "expressions" con-
tained in these works can actually receive copyright protection. This 
makes certain portions (the "ideas") of every work freely available for 
others to copy.17 Such permitted borrowing from copyrighted works osten-
sibly keeps copyright from unduly restricting speech and running afoul of 
the first amendment. IS 
Theoretically, the idea/expression dichotomy discharges copyright's 
first amendment duties because the application of copyright protection to 
expressions, but not to ideas, serves to prohibit only speech that is consti-
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982) ("[I)t is well established that there is no conflict between the 
First Amendment and the copyright laws."); McGraw-Hili, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc. 335 F. 
Supp. 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("Defendants' First Amendment argument can be dismissed as flying 
in the face of established law."). See also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) ("defendant's [first amendment) claim can be dismissed 
without a lengthy discussion"); United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (W.D. Okla. 
1974) ("We fail to see any protected first amendment right or privilege to usurp the benefits" of the 
copyright holder.). 
" Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th 
Cir. 1977) ("[T)he impact, if any, of the first amendment on copyright has not been discussed by the 
[Supreme) Court. We believe this silence stems not from neglect but from the fact that the idea-
expression dichotomy already serves to accommodate the competing interests of copyright and the first 
amendment."); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("The 'ideal 
expression' dichotomy serves to accommodate any 1st Amendment concerns .... "). 
1. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). 
17 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (idea of double entry bookkeeping with all transac-
tions appearing on one page of a ledger not copyrightable). See infra notes 41-78 and accompanying 
text. 
18 In Nimmer's view, the idea/expression dichotomy represented an acceptable "definitional bal-
ance" between copyright and the first amendment. Granting copyright protection to an author's ex-
pression could be weighed against denying copyright protection to her ideas, thereby leading to a 
balance between the competing values of copyright and the first amendment. Nimmer, supra note 9, 
at 1190-93. Under "definitional balancing," the balance struck in one case serves as a rule for resolv-
ing the conflict between copyright and the first amendment in future cases. Nimmer, The Right to 
Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 
CALIF. L. REV. 935, 944-45 (1968). 
In Goldstein's view, the idea/expression dichotomy was simply one of several doctrines which dis-
charged copyright's first amendment functions. Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1020. 
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tutionally valueless.I9 In other words, to the extent that copyright silences 
only those who merely repeat what others have already expressed, it dis-
turbs only expression which adds nothing new to the "marketplace of 
ideas."2o Similarly, to the extent that copyright permits the borrowing of 
ideas, it leaves ample room to authors whose works do not merely repeat 
the expression of others, but rather add to the "marketplace of ideas."21 
Indeed, copyright encourages these authors to contribute by granting them 
exclusive rights in their work.22 Under this view, copyright law can be 
characterized as a facilitator of speech entirely consistent with the first 
amendment.23 
Unfortunately, such analysis overlooks the fact that the first amendment 
guarantees more than just the protection of speech deemed constitutionally 
valuable. The first amendment also recognizes that laws are sometimes 
unavoidably vague, thereby making prospective speakers unsure as to 
whether or not their contemplated expression is prohibited. This uncer-
tainty creates a "chilling effect" which forces individuals to forego exercis-
ing their first amendment rights for fear of being prosecuted or sued. In 
such cases, the first amendment requires clear legal standards which leave 
breathing room for the exercise of constitutionally valuable speech. This 
means pulling legal standards back from constitutional limits, so that any 
speech deterred by vague standards falls on the constitutionally valueless 
side of the line.!~4 
When these requirements are used to examine the position which courts 
have taken on copyright and the first amendment, it becomes apparent 
,. The Supreme Court has often pointed to the lack of constitutional value as a justification for 
otherwise unconstitutional limitations on speech. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) 
("the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do 
not enjoy constitutional protection"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, reh'g. denied, 355 
U.S. 852 (1957) ("implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as 
utterly without redeeming social importance"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 
(1942) ("fighting words" one of several classes of speech which receive no constitutional protection). 
20 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1191-92. 
21 See, e.g., Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1170 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The 'marketplace of ideas' is not limited by copyright because copyright is 
limited to protection or expression."); M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03 
[AUl), at 13-20.2 - 13-20.3 (1988) [hereinafter NIMMER TREATISE). 
22 See supra nou: 11; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, reh'g. denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954). 
23 See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1191; Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1001. 
.. For further di!.CUssion of this topic and its application to copyright law, see infra Section IV, 
notes 155-98 and accompanying text. 
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that reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy to reconcile copyright with 
the first amendment is unjustified. Even though copyright theoretically 
aims only at constitutionally valueless speech, judicial interpretation of the 
idea/expression dichotomy has failed to leave ample room for constitution-
ally valuable expression. Problems connected with separating idea from 
expression have caused many copyright decisions to rest upon the courts' 
ad hoc sense of what is permissible copying rather than upon any tangible 
principles.25 Such unprincipled decision making is constitutionally suspect 
because it leaves courts and citizens uncertain about the contours of con-
stitutionally significant doctrine. This uncertainty -ultimately causes copy-
right's unacceptable chilling effect. 
This Article will examine the free speech problems caused by the 
courts' reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy to keep copyright within 
its first amendment limits. This examination will consist of three steps. 
First, the Article will examine the idea/expression dichotomy to see if it 
provides a principled limit which can be assessed against the first amend-
ment. The Article will find that the methodologies adopted for separating 
idea from expression leave the courts on a proverbial "slippery slope" on 
which it is easy to lose sight of first amendment values. Second, the Article 
will examine cases which slide down the slippery slope by allowing ex-
tremely general and abstract similarities between works to serve as the 
basis for copyright claims. Instead of limiting copyright to the protection 
of relatively concrete facets of works, these cases protect a work's "total 
concept and feel."26 The Article will demonstrate the manner in which 
these cases destroy the idea/expression dichotomy's ability to check the 
unlimited expansion of copyright. Third, the Article will assess the impli-
•• See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,489 (2d Cir. 1960) 
("Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' 
and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."); Herbert Rosen-
thal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing Peter Pan Fabrics). See 
also Knowles and Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN 
FERN. V.L. REV. 109, 124 (1980) (arguing that there is no distinction between idea and expression) . 
• 6 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that copyright in a work's "total concept and feel" 
amounts to copyright in the work's general appearance. Under such a theory, infringement "may 
appear from the mood evoked by a work." See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1983). As the 
reader may surmise, the notion that a work's general concept and appearance may be monopolized 
through copyright is extremely controversial. For a more complete description of "total concept and 
feel" copyright suits and the ensuing controversy, see infra Section III, notes 80-154 and accompany-
ing text. 
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cations of this line of cases as regards the first amendment. Specifically, 
the Article will show that these cases create a constitutionally unaccept-
able "chilling effect" on protected speech. The Article will conclude with 
some suggestions for bringing copyright law back to its first amendment 
limits. 
II. THE INSTINCTIVE NATURE OF THE IDEA/ExPRESSION 
DICHOTOMY 
The United States Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to 
grant authors copyrights in their works.27 The theory behind this author-
ity is that Congress can maximize the creative output of authors by grant-
ing them limited monopolies over their works.28 The copyright code cur-
rently extends such monopolies to original works of authorship29 fixed in 
any tangible medium.30 
Once a work qualifies for copyright protection, its author gains several 
exclusive rights: the right to reproduce the work; the right to prepare de-
rivative works; the right to distribute copies of the work; the right to per-
form the work; and the right to display the work publicly.31 Conse-
quently, the author may sue those who copy the author's work without 
authorization for copyright infringement.32 
The evaluation of the idea/expression diChotomy begins by understand-
ing how the dichotomy regulates the kind and degree of similarity re-
quired to support a claim of copyright infringement.33 To prove an in-
'7 Congress shall have the power: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8. 
28 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, reh'g. denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954). 
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Instead of defining the term "original," the 1976 Copyright Code 
incorporates the concep: of originality that courts had previously developed under the old code. NIM-
MER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 2.01, at 2-6. Courts do not require original works to be novel or 
innovative. Id., § 2.01[Aj, at 2-7 - 2-8. Rather, "[ojriginality means only that the work owes its 
origin to the author, i.e., is independently created, and not copied from other works." Id., § 2.01 [Aj at 
2-8 . 
• 0 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). A work is fixed in a tangible medium if either a person or a 
machine can read the work. NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 2.03[Bj(1j, at 2-28. 
31 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) . 
• 2 The available remedies include damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. 17 U.S.C. §§ 
503-05 (1982). See NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 14.01 - 14.11, at 14-3 - 14-86 . 
•• Not surprisingly, copyright prohibits both literal and non-literal copying. Learned Hand once 
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fringement claim, a copyright plaintiff must establish: 1) that she owns a 
copyright in the allegedly copied work and 2) that the defendant copied 
the plaintiff's work.34 As a practical matter, the first element presents no 
problem of proof. Given the federal system of copyright registration, 
plaintiffs can easily demonstrate ownership of their own works.311 By con-
trast, the second element of copying offers two avenues of proof.36 
Following the first method, the plaintiff can produce direct evidence of 
copying.37 Under this scenario, the plaintiff proves copying by identifying 
certain similarities between her work and the defendant's work and offer-
ing eyewitness or other direct evidence which shows that the defendant 
borrowed those similarities from the plaintiff.38 
Alternatively, if no such evidence is available, the plaintiff may also 
prove copying via circumstantial evidence. To accomplish this, the plain-
tiff establishes that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work and 
that the defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's.39 The 
courts presume that the defendant copied from the plaintiff's work when 
the defendant's work is so similar that the likely cause of the identified 
similarity is copying."o 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that all copyright claims depend 
upon id~ntified similarities between the works of the plaintiff and defend-
stated that illicit copying need not be word for word "else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial 
variations." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). Thus, a movie that 
closely duplicates the plot, characters, and structure of a previous movie can infringe a copyright in 
the earlier work. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Film Ventures Int'l, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134 
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (movie Great White so similar to movie Jaws in plot, setting, and characters that 
infringement occurred). 
34 Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1986); Hasbro 
Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1985); NIMMER TREATISE, supra 
note 21, § 13.01, at 13-3 - 13-4. 
35 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (1982). 
36 NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 13.01[B], at 13-6 - 13-9. 
37 [d., § 13.01[B], at 13-6. 
38 [d. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 445-46 (4th Cir. 1986) (defend-
ant's modification of reproduction in order to avoid copyright liability may be taken as evidence of 
unlawful copying); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D. 
Cal. 1986) (defendant's order that employees copy display screens of plaintiff's computer program 
provided direct evidence of infringement). 
3. NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 13.01[B], at 13-7. 
4. !d., § 13.01[B], at 13-7 - 13-8. 
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ant.41 However, the fact that the defendant's copying caused these similar-
ities does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff wins. If the defendant's 
borrowing is restricted to the ideas behind the plaintiff's work, then the 
idea/expresssion dichotomy excuses the copying.42 To put it another way, 
even if the plaintiff proves that certain similarities between two. works 
arose from the defendant's copying, the plaintiff loses if those similarities 
are only similarities of idea, and not similarities of expression.43 
Brief reflection on this state of affairs reveals the important role played 
by the idea/expression dichotomy in regulating the scope of copyright. On 
the one hand, if courts adopt a narrow view of idea and a broad view of 
expression, more and more similarities will be similarities of expression 
and will therefore support claims of infringement. In turn, this implies a 
broad scope of copyright. Conversely, if courts adopt a broad view of idea 
and a narrow view of expression, few similarities will qualify as similari-
ties of expression. This will result in a relatively limited scope of 
copyright. 
The seminal case of Baker v. Selden44 was one of the first to employ 
the idea/expression dichotomy to deny a claim of copyright.45 In Baker, 
the plaintiff held a valid copyright in the book "Selden's Condensed 
Ledger, or Bookkeeping Simplified." The book set forth a system of ac-
counting, and contained a number of forms which could be used to imple-
ment the system.46 The defendant authored a series of books which de-
scribed essentially the same system of accounting as the plaintiff's work. 
The defendant's work contained forms which implemented the system, but 
which also had their columns arranged differently from those on the 
plaintiff's forms.47 The issue before the Court was whether or not the 
.. These similarities need not be literal similarities. See infra Section III, notes 80-154 and 
accompanying text for discussion of several cases in which non-literal similarity supported a claim of 
infringement. 
4. NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 2.03[D), at 2-34 - 2-34.1. 
4. [d. 
44 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
4. When the present copyright code was enacted in 1976, Congress made clear its intention to 
codify the idea/expression dichotomy first set forth in Baker. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5670 ("[Section 102(b)'s) pur-
pose is to restate, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichot-
omy between expression and idea remains unchanged."). 
4. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100. 
4' [d. 
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defendant's work, particularly his forms, infringed the plaintiff's work,48 
In ruling for the defendant, the Court stated that copyright protected 
only the plaintiff's description of the accounting system.49 Contrary to the 
plaintiff's assertion, copyright did not and could not extend to the system 
itself, which was the "idea" behind the plaintiff's work,IiO The plaintiff's 
description of the underlying system was entitled to copyright, but the 
copyright could not be used to prevent others from using or describing the 
system themselves.lil If the copyright claim were allowed, the plaintiff 
would be able to stop others from using or describing the system. This 
was unacceptable. 1i2 
Baker implied that the ideal expression dichotomy could be imple-
mented by a two step analysis. First, the court identifies the idea underly-
ing the work in which copyright is ~laimed. Second, the court determines 
if enforcing the plaintiff's copyright claim creates an unacceptable risk of 
monopolizing that underlying idea. If so, the court enters judgment for the 
defendant. liS 
The typical method for assessing the risk of monopolizing a given idea 
involves counting the number of ways the idea can be expressed.1i4 If the 
idea can be expressed in many different ways, the danger of monopolizing 
the idea via a single copyright is minimal. Granting the plaintiff a monop-
oly over her chosen expression of the idea and reasonably similar expres-
sions leaves plenty of alternate expressions for future authors. In this con-
text, the courts can safely grant broad copyright protection to works, 
requiring future authors to use very dissimilar expressions of the same 
idea. Only a moderate degree of similarity need be required to support a 
.8 [d. at 101. 
•• [d. at 102-04 . 
•• [d. at 104-05 . 
• 1 [d. at 104 . 
•• [d. at 103-04 . 
•• See NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 13.03[A), at 13-20 - 13-20.1. 
•• See, e.g., Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) (since factual works have a narrow range of expression, plaintiff 
must establish verbatim copying to support a claim of infringement); Atari, Inc. v. North American 
Philips Consumer Elees. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) 
(" 'scope of copyright protection increases with the extent expression differs from the idea'" (quoting 
Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 
1977))). This method of analysis is sometimes calIed the "plurality of expressions test." 
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claim of infringement. 55 
On the other hand, if the range of available expressions is small, simi-
larly broad copyright protection raises a high risk of allowing a single 
copyright to monopolize an entire idea. Since relatively few ways to ex-
press the idea exist, an author could tie up all of the available expressions 
by means of a single copyright. This would be unacceptable. In this con-
text, courts must construe the copyright law very narrowly, and should 
deem only similarity which is close to literal as sufficient to support a 
claim of infringement. 56 
The case of Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc. 57 
provides a good example of this reasoning. In Landsberg, the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered a copyright claim involving two books which described 
strategies to be used in playing the game Scrabble.58 The plaintiff, who 
had been negotiating with the defendant over the defendant's prospective 
purchase of the plaintiff's book, sued when the defendant refused to 
purchase the book, and instead turned out its own book which was based 
on the plaintiff's book.59 Even though the defendant paraphrased "a sig-
nificant part" of the plaintiff's work, the court refused to find infringe-
ment.60 The court recognized that while the similarities between the two 
works might prove infringement in many cases, the limited range of ex-
pressions inherent in the ideas behind a book about how to play Scrabble 
required more literal copying to prove infringement.61 
•• See, e.g., Atari, 672 F.2d at 617-18 (similarity between maze games Pac-Man and K.C. 
Munchkin held sufficient to support plaintiff's claim of infringement despite differences between the 
mazes, characters and scoring targets of the two games); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures 
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 49-56 (2d Cir. 1936) (parallel plot development between movie and play held 
sufficient to support claim of infringement despite absence of literal copying) . 
•• McGraw-Hili, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(Nature of economics dictates similarities between two economics textbooks. Therefore, similarities of 
form between plaintiff's and defendant's books not sufficient to support claim of infringement.); Dor-
sey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 874 (10th Cir. 1938) (Court found that insurance forms 
could be expressed in a limited number of ways. "To constitute infringement in such cases a showing 
of appropriation in the exact form or substantially so of the copyrighted material should be 
required.") . 
•• 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) . 
• s Id. at 486-87 . 
•• Id. at 487. In fact, the defendant conducted negotiations with the plaintiff for the express 
purpose of delaying plaintiff's publication. Id. 
6·Id . 
• 1 Id. at 488-89. 
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The court bolstered its reasoning by comparing the works at hand to 
ordinary works of fiction. On the one hand, the ideas underlying ordinary 
fictional works are capable of many expressions. For example, the idea of 
"girl meets boy" has been cast and recast in thousands of different forms. 
Thus, relatively broad copyright protection for these works raises few 
risks of allowing a copyright in a single work to degenerate into a monop-
oly over an entire genre of human expression.62 
By contrast, the ideas behind factual works are not expressible in as 
many ways.63 In the case at hand, the similarities between the two works 
were dictated by the fact that both works described how to play Scrabble. 
Broad copyright protection would therefore raise unacceptable risks of 
creating a monopoly over the ideas behind the works, namely the methods 
described. Thus the plaintiff, while entitled to hold a copyright in his 
work, could not succeed in this action absent more literal infringement by 
the defendant.64 
The above-described analysis is attractive because it indicates how ap-
plying the idea/expression dichotomy can prevent overbroad copyright 
claims. However, the analysis is deficient in that it provides no definition 
of what constitutes an idea. To ensure that copyright claims do not result 
in the monopolization of ideas, courts must necessarily develop concepts 
and terms which enable them to identify ideas. Otherwise courts would 
simply have to guess as to whether or not a copyright claim risked the 
monopolization of ideas, or only expression.65 The idea/expression dichot-
omy could become so amorphous that courts would have no principled 
62 Id. 
6S Id. 
IU Id. at 489. In some cases, courts have found that the range of expressions is so narrow that 
copyright in the relevant works must be completely denied. In these situations, idea and expression 
are said to have "merged." See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th 
Cir. 1971) (since idea of a bee shaped pin encrusted with jewels is indistinguishable from its expres-
sion, defendant would be allowed to copy plaintiff's expression); Morrisey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (contest rules capable of being expressed in such a limited number of 
ways that copyright in those rules must be denied); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 
702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958) (copyright in plaintiff's insurance forms would lead 
to monopolization of underlying ideas, so plaintiff enjoined from asserting any claim that his forms 
were copyrighted). 
6. Indeed, the notion that ideas can be identified separately from expression may be incorrect. 
See Knowles and Palmieri, supra note 25, at 124. 
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manner in which to apply the doctrine.66 
Fortunately, some progress has been made in this area. In the case of 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,67 Judge Learned Hand authored the 
most widely quoted distinction between idea and expression: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of pat-
terns of increasing generality wiII fit equally well, as more and more 
of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the 
most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might 
consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the play-
wright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from 
their expression, his property is never extended.68 
Hand first applied this analysis to the plays Abie's Irish Rose and The 
Cohens and The Kellys.69 Certain similarities between the two were 
plain. Both involved the marriage of Jewish and Irish children, the ten-
sions between the two families, the birth of grandchildren, and the resolu-
tion of the turmoil by fortuitous circumstance which leaves all concerned 
to live happily ever after.70 Hand acknowledged these similarities, but 
noted the differences between the two plays as well. In one, religious zeal-
otry played a larger role in causing the tension between the families. In 
the other, sudden wealth created the trouble. In one, the grandchildren 
played a large role in effecting the reconciliation between the families. In 
the other, the grandchildren played no role at all.7l After all this, Hand 
concluded that even though copyright does not require literal infringe-
ment,72 the material that had been borrowed from the plaintiff was "too 
generalized an abstraction of what she wrote. It was only a part of her 
'ideas.' »73 Therefore, the plaintiff's claim for copyright infringement was 
denied . 
•• For a discussion of how this ambiguity leads to constitutional problems, see infra Section IV, 
notes 155-98 and accompanying text . 
• 7 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) . 
• s [d. at 121. 8. Hand described The Cohens and The Kellys as a "motion picture play." [d. at 120. 
7. [d. at 120-21. 
71 [d. at 121-22 . 
.. [d. at 121. 
73 [d. at 122. 
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Initially, it appears that Hand's description of ideas as more abstract 
than expressions has solved the difficult problem of identifying ideas. 
However, closer analysis reveals that the quest for separation of idea and 
expression in Nichols is still based primarily on instinct, and not upon 
some principled distinction between the two categories.74 
In particular, the Nichols opinion never stated any principle which tells 
the court where to draw the line between idea and expression. Instead, 
Hand simply compared the two works, analyzed their similarities, and 
instinctively decided whether or not the similarity was literal enough to 
warrant a finding of infringement. Hand's reliance on instinct was further 
shown by the dissatisfaction he expressed with the trial court's use of ex-
pert witnesses. Hand complained that experts drew the court's attention 
toward the "intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship" and away from the 
court's "firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered impressions."76 
Presently, the consensus view is that Hand's attempt to solve the ideal 
expression dichotomy is the best effort to date.76 Therefore, since Hand 
himself admitted that his solution rested ultimately upon instinct, the 
idea/expression dichotomy does not provide a clear, principled separation 
between the first amendment and copyright law. Instead, the best that can 
be said is that the idea/expression dichotomy provides a slippery slope on 
which to slide in our efforts to properly limit copyright law. The interpre-
tation of the idea/expression dichotomy found at the top of this slope re-
quires literal similarity to support a claim of infringement. This leads to a 
narrow scope of copyright. By contrast, the interpretation found at the 
bottom of the slope permits almost any abstract similarity between works 
7. Indeed, Hand himself knew that he had only defined the parameters of the debate, and that 
the boundary between idea and expression could not be fixed. In reference to the division between 
idea and expression, Hand wrote, "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever 
can." Id. at 121. 
75 Id. at 123. See also Couleur Int'l Ltd. v. Opulent Fabrics, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 152, 153 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("Good eyes and common sense may be as useful as deep study of reported and 
unreported cases, which themselves are tied to highly particularized facts."). 
7. See, e.g., Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163 ("No court or commentator ... has been able to improve 
upon Judge Learned Hand's famous 'abstractions test' articulated in Nichols . ..• "). Numerous 
cases dealing with the idea/expression dichotomy cite Hand's test for separating idea from expression. 
See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 
(1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. 
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 624 (2d 
Cir. 1982). 
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to support a claim of infringement. This leads to a broad scope of 
copyright. 
Brief reflection proves the necessity of this proposition. Literal, concrete 
descriptions of a. work will fit very few other works. Thus, requiring 
plaintiffs to use literal similarities in support of copyright claims keeps 
plaintiffs from suing the authors of vaguely similar works. This narrows 
the scope of a given copyright's preclusive power. By contrast, abstract, 
general descriptions of any work will fit not only the work in question, 
but many other works as well. Allowing such similarities to support a 
copyright claim lets plaintiffs sue the authors of works which only vaguely 
resemble the plaintiffs' works. This broadens copyright's scope. 
For example, if Mickey Mouse is described literally as "a cartoon char-
acter in the shape of a mouse as created by Walt Disney," the description 
would extend to few, if any, other characters. Indeed, any characters 
which also fit this description would probably look just like Mickey 
Mouse. Not surprisingly, a narrow claim of copyright based upon such a 
description of Disney'S work would probably be enforced." 
By contrast, if Mickey were described more abstractly as "a cartoon 
character in the shape of a mouse," the description would fit a wider 
range of figures. Copyrights based on such a description would probably 
include such figures as Mighty Mouse, and might not be enforced. 
Finally, if Mickey were even more abstractly described as "a cartoon 
character ," the description would fit a very broad range of figures such as 
Bugs Bunny, Fred Flintstone, and Yogi Bear. If such a general claim of 
copyright in Mickey Mouse were in fact enforced, the creator of Mickey 
Mouse could sue the creators of Fred Flintstone, Bugs Bunny, and Yogi 
Bear. The scope of such a claim would be broad and unwarranted. One 
suspects that a court confronted by such a claim of copyright would dis-
miss the plaintiff's claim under the idea/expression dichotomy.78 
From a first amendment point of view, the unmasking of the idea/ex-
77 See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
1132 (1979) (plaintiff's copyright in Mickey Mouse enforced against defendants, who published 
magazines depicting Disney cartoon characters engaged in promiscuous behavior). 
7. Cj. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (similarities 
between defendant's show, The Greatest American Hero, and plaintiff's character, Superman, were 
insufficient to support claim of infringement). 
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pression dichotomy as a primarily instinctive limit on copyright raises the 
likelihood that there are constitutionally suspect lines of copyright cases. 
First of all, the slippery slope nature of the idea/expression dichotomy 
means that there is no clear limiting principle which assures compliance 
with the first amendment. Furthermore, since courts generally see no need 
to even consider the first amendment when interpreting the ideal expres-
sion dichotomy,79 there is simply no reason to believe that those slippery 
slope decisions have fortuitously conformed to first amendment require-
ments. Instead, it is highly likely that in their haste to do equity between 
the parties, courts have forgotten first amendment principles when apply-
ing the copyright law. The next section of this Article will examine a line 
of cases in which these oversights occurred. 
III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR A WORK'S "TOTAL CONCEPT 
AND FEEL" 
The fact that Hand's analysis ultimately rested on instinct did not viti-
ate its usefulness. The value of Judge Hand's analysis lay in his realiza-
tion that abstract, non-literal claims of copyright were likely to improp-
erly stretch the scope of copyright law, and that abstract facets of works 
should therefore be considered ideas. This suggests that our constitutional 
assessment of copyright's limits would do well to look for cases which 
adopt or suggest the enforcement of vague and general claims of copyright. 
Such a line of cases exists, beginning with two Ninth Circuit opinions, 
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card CO.80 and Sid & Marty Krofft Tele-
vision Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.81 
In Roth, both parties made and sold greeting cards. The plaintiff, Roth, 
contended that United had infringed copyrights that Roth held in seven 
studio greeting cards.82 Roth's cards were simple. They involved original 
artwork combined with phrases such as "i wuv you" and "I miss you 
already ... and You Haven't even Left ... "83 Although United's cards 
were similar to Roth's, United claimed that Roth should lose for two rea-
sons. First, United had not infringed Roth's original artwork. Second, the 
19 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
80 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). 
81 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
82 429 F.2d at 1107. 
83 [d. at 1110. 
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phrases used by Roth belonged in the public domain and were therefore 
uncopyrightable.84 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It held that even though United's conten-
tions were true, Roth's combination of uncopyrightable words and origi-
nal artwork was in fact copyrightable expression.85 In this case, United's 
cards were substantially similar to Roth's because they shared the same 
"total concept and feel." United's cards infringed Roth's not because the 
artwork or phrases were identical, but because "the characters depicted in 
the art work, the mood they portrayed, the combination of art work con-
veying a particular mood with a particular message, and the arrange-
ment of the words on the greeting card are substantially the same .... "86 
In Krofft, the Ninth Circuit considered a claim that McDonald's 
McDonaldland advertisements infringed the plai.ntiffs' copyright in the 
popular H. R. Pufnstuf series.87 The Pufnstuf series was a full length 
Saturday morning children's television program. It involved "several fan-
ciful costumed characters" and a boy named Jimmy who lived in a 
fantasyland called Living Island. Living Island was inhabited by talking 
books and moving trees.88 
In 1970, an advertising agency contacted the producers of the Pufnstuf 
series to inquire about basing a McDonald's advertising campaign upon 
the Pufnstuj series. No agreement for such a campaign was ever 
reached.89 However, in 1971, McDonald's began its McDonaldland ad-
vertising campaign,90 which contained various general similarities to the 
Pufnstuf series.91 
8< Id. at 1109-10 . 
•• The court accepted Roth's contention that" '[I]t is the arrangement or the words, their combi-
nation and plan, together with the appropriate art work. . .' which is original, the creation or Roth, 
and entitled to copyright protection." Id. at 1109 (brackets in the original). 
88 Id. at 1110 (emphasis added). 
81 562 F.2d at 1160. 
88 Id. at 1161. 
.9 Apparently, the advertising agency misled the plaintiffs about the status or the proposed cam-
paign.Id. 
90 Id. at 1161-62. 
91 Id. at 1166-67. The court wrote that both contained: 
imaginary worlds inhabited by anthromorphic [sic] plants and animals and other rancirul 
creatures. The dominant topographical reatures or the locales are the same: trees, caves, a 
pond, a road, and a castle. Both works reature a rorest with talking trees that have human 
races and characteristics. 
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In its defense, McDonald's admitted that it had borrowed the "idea" of 
H. R. Pufnstuf - namely the idea of a "fantasyland filled with diverse 
and fanciful characters in action."92 However, McDonald's contended that 
its expression of that idea was substantially dissimilar from the plaintiffs', 
and that infringement therefore did not exist. McDonald's came to this 
conclusion by identifying various components of the two expressions and 
pointing out the dissimilarities.93 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the analysis ig-
nored the idea/expression dichotomy.94 Instead, the court applied a two-
step test purportedly based upon the idea/expression dichotomy to deter-
mine whether substantial similarity exists between two works.911 The first 
step of this test was designed to decide whether the two works shared the 
same ideas. This step, called the "extrinsic test," involved the listing and 
analysis of specific characteristics of the works. Since this test required 
detailed analysis, the court held that dissection and expert testimony were 
appropriate at this point.96 
The second step of the test was designed to determine whether the simi-
larities of ideas identified in the previous step were enough to constitute 
substantial similarity of expression.97 Drawing on Judge Hand's observa-
tion that the line between appropriation of ideas and appropriation of 
expression must be ad hoc, the court left this determination to the "re-
sponse of the ordinary reasonable person."98 Since this step, labelled the 
"intrinsic test," depended on the response of ordinary individuals, no dis-
section or expert analysis would be allowed.99 
Since McDonald's had already admitted borrowing the idea from the 
The characters are also similar. Both lands are governed by mayors who have dispropor-
tionately large round heads dominated by long wide mouths. They are assisted by "Key-
stone cop" characters. Both lands feature strikingly similar crazy scientists and a multi-
armed evil creature. 
Id. at 1167 n.9. 
92 Id. at 1165. 
93 Id. 
0< Id . 
• G Id. at n.7. 
98 Id. at 1164 . 
• 7 Id. 
98 Id. 
··Id. 
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plaintiffs' work, the court applied only the intrinsic test. IOO Because no 
dissection was appropriate, the court compared the subjective qualities of 
the two works.IOI Following Roth, the court held that McDonald's had 
improperly copied the "total concept and feel" of the Pufnstuf show, and 
held for the plaintiffs.l02 
Although neither case purported to do so, Roth and Krofft implied a 
potentially massive restructuring of the distinction between idea and ex-
pression that Judge Hand defined. Hand analyzed the issue of substantial 
similarity by comparing relatively concrete facets of works, such as plot 
and characters. lOll Under this analysis, Hand characterized abstract and 
vague features of works as ideas, and not expressions. Consequently, ab-
stract similarities between works would not be enough to support a copy-
right infringement claim.l04 
By contrast, the Roth and Krofft courts saw no need to restrict the 
scope of protected. expression to concrete facets of works. Indeed, the Roth 
court ignored the fact that the defendant had borrowed no concrete copy-
rightable expression, and based its finding of infringement upon similari-
ties of mood conveyed. Similarly, Krofft's application of its intrinsic test 
for substantial similarity expressly rejected the defendants' attempts to 
compare concrete aspects of the two works to demonstrate dissimilarity. 1011 
More importantly, by treating the "total concept and feel" of a work as 
part of its protectable expression, Roth and Krofft established that very 
abstract similarities between two works could support a claim of copyright 
infringement. 
The full implication of "total concept and feel" copyright protection 
becomes apparent when one considers just how abstract and subjective the 
100 [d. at 1165. 
101 [d. at 1167, 1169. 
102 [d. at 1167. The court's opinion demonstrates the abstract and broad nature of the plaintiffs' 
successful copyright claim. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. The court's holding that 
these similarities constitute appropriation of copyrightable expression is highly questionable. If these 
facets, alone or in combination, were copyrightable, then the plaintiffs presumably infringed the works 
of numerous authors. For example, the court's reliance on the use of "disproportionately large round 
heads dominated by long wide mouths," 562 F.2d at 1167 n.9, would seem to characterize the popular 
Peanuts cartoon strip. See Kulzick and Hogue, Chilled Bird: Freedom of Expression in the Eighties, 
14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. :'7,77 (1980). 
103 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121-23. 
104 [d. at 121. 
10. KrojJt, 562 F.2d at 1165-67. 
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"total concept and feel" of a work can be. As the above analysis made 
clear, Roth and Krofft strongly suggest that the very mood a work creates 
constitutes its protectable expression. lOS If copyright claims can in fact be 
maintained at such a high level of abstraction, practically any similarity 
could conceivably support a finding of infringement. 
Despite their broad implications, Roth and Krofft alone did not disman-
tle the doctrinal limits on copyright. Although Roth and Krofft adopted a 
very liberal view of protectable expression, they did not explicitly adopt a 
hopelessly narrow view of unprotectable idea. Thus, Roth and Krofft dis-
mantled only half of the idea/expression dichotomy, and left future courts 
the opportunity to employ a vigorous conception of idea in order to keep 
copyright from sliding down its slippery slope.lo7 
Not surprisingly, many courts have in fact used a strong vision of idea 
to prevent plaintiffs from realizing the full potential of Roth and Krofft.los 
For example, in Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co./09 the court rejected the plain-
tiff Aliotti's claim that defendant Dakin's Prehistoric Pet line of stuffed 
dinosaurs infringed her Ding-A-Saur line of stuffed dinosaurs. In many 
ways, Aliotti's case was analogous to Krofft. In 1978 and 1979, two 
Dakin executives were shown the Ding-A-Saur dolls as part of a proposal 
that Dakin buy the company which manufactured them.llo Dakin did not 
make the purchase, though Aliotti was told she could call the executives if 
she wanted to be considered for a jobYl Three months later, Dakin devel-
106 The Ninth Circuit has written that "substantial similarity in the expression of an idea may 
appear from the mood evoked by a work." See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 
Krofft and Roth). 
107 In terms of Nimmer's definitional balance, Roth and K rofft implied a change in the balance 
between idea and expression by expanding the scope of copyrightable expression. However, the bal-
ance could be retained if the courts used a vigorous conception of idea to offset the implications of 
Roth and K rofft. See supra note 18 for discussion of Nimmer's definitional balance. 
108 See, e.g., Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1987) (Hallmark's Rain-
bow Brite characters and products not sufficiently similar to plaintiff's graphics and script, entitled 
The Adventures of Rainbow Island, to support claim of infringement); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 
1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985) (movie Coma not sufficiently similar to the screen-
play Reincarnation, Inc. to support a claim of infringement); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985) (movie E.T. - The Extra Terrestrial not suffi-
ciently similar to the musical play Lokey from Maldemar to support a claim of infringement). 
109 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 
110 Id. at 899. 
mId. 
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oped and began selling its Prehistoric Pet line of stuffed dinosaurs.ll2 
Dakin's line included the same species of dinosaurs represented by the 
Ding-a-Saur line.113 Furthermore, the animals shared similar postures 
and body designs.ll4 
In light of Roth and Krofft, Aliotti seemingly had a winning case 
against Dakin. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the idea/expression 
dichotomy prohibited the plaintiff from basing her copyright claim on the 
general similarities between the two lines of toys. The court wrote: 
No copyright protection may be afforded to the idea of producing 
stuffed dinosaur toys or to elements of expression that necessarily 
follO\'( from the idea of such dolls. Appellants therefore may place 
no reliance upon any similarity in expression resulting from either 
the physiognomy of dinosaurs or from the nature of stuffed 
animals.lll! 
Having thus disposed of the major similarities between the two lines of 
toys, the court went on to find that Dakin had not infringed Aliotti's 
line.116 
Unfortunately, other courts have failed to perceive the need to limit 
Roth and Krofft, and have adopted a dangerously weak view of idea. Most 
prominently, the Third Circuit case of Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow 
Dental Laboratory, Inc.1l7 completed what Roth and Krofft started when 
it created an explicit rule for identifying the idea behind a computer 
program. 
In Whelan, the court considered a claim that the defendant's software 
for the operation of a dental laboratory infringed a similar program writ-
ten by the plaintiff.lls The plaintiff built its case around similarities in 
three areas of the two programs: file structures, subroutines, and screen 
outputs.1l9 The defendant countered with the assertion that such similari-
ties reflected only the ideas behind the plaintiff's program, and not the 
112 Id. at 900. 
113 Id. at 902 n.2. 
lU Id. at 901. 
110 Id. at 901 (citation omitted). 
118 Id. at 901-02. 
117 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). 
118 Id. at 1224-27. 
119 Id. at 1228. 
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expression.120 
In finding for the plaintiff, the Third Circuit interpreted Baker v. Sel-
den to create a rule for identifying the idea behind a computer program: 
[TJhe purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the 
work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or 
function would be part of the expression of the idea. . . . Where 
there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then the 
particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there 
is expression, not idea.121 
Applying this rule to the programs at hand, the court found that the 
purpose of the programs was to aid in the business operations of a dental 
laboratory.122 The court then noted the existence of other programs with 
different structures which also assisted the business operations of a dental 
laboratory. In the court's analysis, this demonstrated that the similarities 
between the plaintiff's and defendant's programs were not necessary to the 
underlying idea. Consequently, the danger of monopolizing an idea did 
not exist, and the court found that the defendant had copied expression, 
and not idea.12s 
For purposes of this Article, Whelan's importance lies in its extremely 
limited view of what constitutes a work's uncopyrightable idea.124 By re-
stricting the idea of a program to its purpose or function, Whelan reduced 
the notion of idea to only the most general and abstract facets of a work. 
Whelan's view of the idea/expression dichotomy implied that a program 
or other work embodies only one idea.125 This made practically everything 
120 [d. at 1235. 
121 [d. at 1236 (emphasis in original). The reader will recognize the test here as a version of the 
plurality of expressions test. See supra note 54. 
102 797 F.2d at 1238. 
123 [d. at 1238-39. 
12. Whelan may also be important because the court did not extensively discuss the so-called 
useful article doctrine, which often implies weaker copyright protection for useful articles. Although 
the useful article doctrine serves, along with the idea/expression dichotomy, to limit the scope of 
copyright, courts have not used it to resolve the tension between copyright and the first amendment. 
Thus, the useful article doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the useful 
article doctrine, see NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 2.08[B][31, at 2-88 - 2-96.7. 
125 The danger of implying that any work embodies only one idea is immediately apparent. Any 
great literary work certainly embodies more than one idea. For an analysis of Whelan pointing out 
that computer programs embody more than one idea, see Brinson, Copyrighted Software: Separating 
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found in a work part of its copyrightable expression.126 In other words, 
Whelan adopted a definition of idea which was so weak that it left no 
meaningful limit on the scope of copyrightable expression.127 This dis-
mantled the half of the ideal expression dichotomy left standing by Roth 
and Krafft, namely the broad definition of idea which served to limit the 
tendency to protect abstraction which is inherent in the "total concept and 
feel" doctrine. 
Despite the reservations of many commentators,128 Whelan soon be-
came the leading case for determining the scope of copyright protection in 
computer programs.129 As a result, it was not long before cases combined 
the Protected ExpressWn from Unprotected Ideas, A Starting Point, 29 B.C.L. REV. 803 (1988) . 
••• According to Whelan, a computer program's expression includes the structure of the pro-
gram, as well as the" 'manner in which the program operates, controls and regulates the computer in 
receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing useful information either on a 
screen, print-out or by audio communication.''' Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239 (quoting trial court, 609 
F. Supp. 1307, 1320 (B.D. Pa. 1985». Although this Article is concerned primarily with Whelan's 
implications for the conflict between copyright and the first amendment, it is worth pointing out that 
Whelan misconstrues s(!ction 102(b) of the copyright code, which codified the idea/expression dichot-
omy. A computer program written to aid in the operations of a dental laboratory might, for example, 
take a number from a user, store the number in the computer's memory, perform a computation with 
the number, and display the result on the computer's screen. Under Whelan's view of the ideal 
expression dichotomy, the idea behind the program would be "aiding in the operations of a dental 
laboratory." Therefore, the above-described procedure would be part of the manner in which the 
program operates the computer, and would thus be copyrightable expression. However, the notion 
that a person could somehow prevent others from operating a computer in the same fashion directly 
contradicts section 102(b) of the copyright code. Section 102(b) provides that "In no case does copy-
right protection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, [or] method of operation . .. ." 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (emphasis added). 
"7 "[Whelan's rule] completes the destruction of the idea/expression [sic] as an effective limita-
tion on the protection of copyrighted expression." Note, Does Form Follow Function? The Ideal 
Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REV. 723, 747 
(1988). 
... "[Whelan's rule] is dangerously wrong, and flies in the face of every copyright case involving 
the 'idea/expression dichotomy' since 1880." G. Davis, Computer Software - The Final Frontier: 
Clones, Compatibility lind Copyright, COMPUTER LAW., June 1985, at 2. 
"The Whelan court's rule for dividing idea and expression teeters precariously on the brink be-
tween the arbitrary and the ad hoc •... There is simply no principled stopping point at which to fix 
'function' on the continuum between idea and expression. In this way, the Whelan rule is an unwar-
ranted extension of copyright precedent." Note, supra note 127, at 748. 
"The functions that Whelan was disposed to characterize as protectable expression are more accu-
rately characterized as unprotectable ideas." Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Pro-
grams, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1119, 1126 (1986). 
n. Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455 
(N.D. Ga. 1987) ("The leading case addressing the extent of [non-literal protection for computer 
programs] is Whelan . ... "). But see Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 
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Whelan's extremely restricted view of idea with Krofft's expansive view of 
expression. 
The most prominent of these cases is Broderbund Software, Inc. v. 
Unison World, Inc.lso In Broderbund, the plaintiff held a valid copyright 
in "The Print Shop," a menu driven program which enabled its user to 
design greeting cards on a computer. lSI The defendant had originally con-
tracted with the plaintiff to create an IBM compatible version of "The 
Print Shop." When this arrangement fell through, the defendant contin-
ued the project on its own. The result of the defendant's work was 
"Printmaster," another menu driven program whose screens were based 
upon the screens of "The Print Shop.»lS2 The plaintiff claimed that the 
"Printmaster" screens violated its copyright in the "Print Shop" pro-
gram.ISS In response, the defendant asserted that the ideas behind the 
plaintiff's screens could not be expressed in any substantially different 
way. Therefore, the plaintiff's claim should not be enforced because it 
would monopolize ideas, and not expression.ls4 
In rejecting the defendant's claim, the court first turned to the limited 
view of idea espoused in Whelan,ISG and identified the idea (i.e. purpose) 
behind the two works as "the creation of greeting cards, banners, posters 
and signs that contain infinitely variable combinations of text, graphics, 
and borders.»lSS The court also noted that other programs with dissimilar 
screens had expressed the same idea.ls7 Therefore, enforcing the plaintiff's 
copyright against the defendant would raise no danger of monopolizing 
ideas, and the idea/expression dichotomy need not be applied.lsB 
Having identified the idea behind the two programs, the court went on 
to find that the two programs contained substantially similar expressions 
807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied en bane, 813 F.2d 407, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987) 
(declining to adopt Whelan). 
130 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
131 Id. at 1130. "Menu driven" means that the user operates the program by making selections 
from a list of available commands presented on the computer screen. 
132 Id. at 1130-31. 
lSS Id. at 1130. 
1'" Id. at 1132. 
lS. Id. at 1133. 
lS8 Id. 
lS7 Id. at 1132. 
138 Id. at 1134. 
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of that idea. In doing this, the Broderbund court could easily have pointed 
out the extremely detailed and concrete similarities between the two pro-
grams.139 Drawing from Hand's observations about the danger of mono-
polizing ideas by finding abstract similarities between works,140 such an 
analysis would have demonstrated copying of expression, thereby avoiding 
the error of protecting the ideas behind the plaintiffs program. However, 
the court explicitly chose not to follow this course.141 Instead, the court 
followed the approach taken in Krofft, stating that the issue of similarity 
ultimately hinged not upon a comparison of concrete facets of the two 
programs, but upon whether the defendant's work captured the "total 
concept and feel" of the plaintiffs work.142 
Broderbund's approach to the idea/expression dichotomy is explosive 
stuff. Although B1'oderbund may well have been decided correctly on its 
facts, its combination of Roth and Krofft's broad view of expression with 
Whelan's weak view of idea completely removed copyright's most impor-
tant limiting doctrine.l43 By placing practically all facets of a work in the 
realm of expression and not idea, Broderbund's reasoning gives a clear 
doctrinal signal that practically any copyright claim is possible. Other re-
cent copyright cases vividly illustrate the point. 
For example, in Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Adver-
tising, Inc.,I44 the court considered a claim that television commercials 
made by the defendants infringed commercials made by the plaintiff. One 
of the plaintiffs commercials featured a celebrity actressl415 extolling the 
139 Apparently the similarities were so great that the "Printmaster" screens contained instruc-
tions which were not appropriate for the IBM computers on which it was designed to run. For 
example, both the "Print Shop" and "Printmaster" programs instructed their users to press "Return" 
several times during the program. This command made sense on the Apple computers for which 
"Print Shop" was designed. However, instead of the "Return" key found on Apple computers, IBM 
computers contained an "Enter" key. Id. at 1135. The court noted other detailed similarities through-
out the opinion. /d. at 1135-37. 
140 See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text. 
141 648 F. Supp. at 1136. 
14. Id. at 1137. For another recent case which adopts Whelan's reasoning to protect the "total 
concept and feel" of a <:omputer program, see Digital Communications Assocs., Inc., v. Softklone 
Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). 
143 In terms of the definitional balance adopted by Nimmer, Broderbund put all of its weight 
behind expression without putting a countervailing weight behind idea. 
1" 674 F. Supp. 671 (D. Minn. 1987). 
14. The actress was Deborah Shelton, best known for her role in the television series Dallas. Id. 
at 673. 
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virtues of a newspaper and a radio station. The opening shot was a close-
up of the actress with her name in the lower left of the screen. The rest of 
the commercial involved a series of twenty rapidly displayed photographs 
of the actress. A different line of spoken dialogue accompanied each pho-
tograph.146 The defendants' commercials were inspired by the plaintiff's 
commercials. One of the defendants' commercials also involved an opening 
close-up of the same actress with her name in the lower right of the 
screen. The rest of that commercial involved fourteen rapidly displayed 
photographs of the actress. Again, a separate line of dialogue accompanied 
each photograph.147 
Both parties agreed that the two commercials involved completely dif-
... [d. at 674. The dialogue was as follows: 
What do the Daily News and a hot bubble bath have 
in common? 
Me. 
I just love them both. 
Everybody knows about the Daily News' commitment 
to the Valley 
And its commitment to excellence. 
There is another paper that says it covers the 
Valley 
But everybody knows 
They're over the hill. 
Can you imagine living in the Valley and not 
reading the Daily News? 
That's like wearing all new underwear and not 
getting hit by a bus. 
What a waste. 
Daily 
News. 
Daily 
And Sundays. 
You 
Ought to look into that. 
[d. 
... The dialogue was as follows: 
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ferent text and subject matter.148 Additionally, the defendants apparently 
used their own photographs of the actress. Thus, the primary similarities 
between the commercials were their use of the actress and of the "rapid-
edit style." Despite these facts, the court denied the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. In so deciding, the court held that the idea behind the 
two commercials was either the use of a celebrity spokesperson in an ad-
vertisement or the idea that the actress was beautiful. For this reason, 
both the close-up photographs and the "rapid-edit style" of the plaintiff's 
commercials were protectable expression, and the two commercials were 
substantially similar in "total concept and feel.»l49 
Brief reflection reveals how Blore's use of the Roth-Broderbund ap-
proach led to its unusual result. Like Whelan and Broderbund, Blore 
adopted a very limited view of idea. Indeed, the characterization of the 
commercials' idea as the actress's beauty seems especially bizarre. When 
the "total concept and feel" approach of Roth and K roJJt was added to 
this limited view, a correspondingly broad range of copyrightable expres-
sion resulted. This allowed the court to find the two commercials substan-
tially similar despite their complete differences in script and subject 
matter. IIlO 
There are some things in life that should 
take more than an hoUl". 
But making your glasses isn't one of them. 
Duling Optical Super Store 
Has thousands of designer frames 
And contact lenses to choose from. 
I can have my eyes examined 
And have my new glasses and 
Contact lenses in about an hour. 
And they're guaranteed to be 
Prescription perfect. 
The Duling Optical Super Store 
The one-stop shopping 
That allows me more time for 
Other things. 
[d. at 675. 
,.. [d. 
,.. [d. at 678. 
n. Another example of limited idea and expanded expression can be found in McCulloch v. 
Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987), in which the Ninth Circuit considered a claim 
that the defendants had infringed the plaintifPs copyrighted plate, which bore the phrase "You Are 
Special Today" along with a floral design. [d. at 318. The defendants, who also manufactured a plate 
bearing the same phrase along with a floral design, countered with the argument that their borrowing 
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The results of cases like Roth, Krofft, and Blore raised some disturbing 
questions.llll For example, if a work's "total concept and feel" is pro-
tected, do the creators of Batman and other caped heroes owe royalties to 
Superman's creators? On a more serious level, can the authors of the first 
encyclopedia claim that later authors of encyclopedias stole their "total 
concept and feel"? If copyright prevents others from borrowing the style 
of the Blore commercials, do composers who emulate the style of Stravin-
sky owe royalties to his heirs ?11l2 
was limited to the idea behind the plaintiff's work. /d. at 319. 
The court rejected the defendant's claims. In finding for the plaintiff, the court held that the idea 
was "to honor somebody at dinner if they had done something." /d. at 320. Since this extremely weak 
view of idea could be expressed in many ways (e.g. by giving the special person a plaque, gold watch, 
or jeweled pin), enforcing the plaintiff's claim would pose no undue risk of monopolizing the idea. I d. 
Next, the court followed Roth's "total concept and feel" approach to infringement. ld. at 319, 321. 
Not surprisingly, the two plates were held to be substantially similar, and the plaintiff won. ld. at 
319. 
See also Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (defendant's 
poster advertising the film Moscow on the Hudson infringed plaintiff's well-known illustration which 
appeared on the March 29, 1976 front cover of The New Yorker); Atari, Inc. v. North American 
Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (similarity 
between maze games Pac-Man and K.C. Munchkin supports plaintiff's claim of infringement despite 
differences between the mazes, characters and scoring targets of the two games). For a critical analysis 
of Atari, see Hemnes, The Adaptation ofCopyrjght Law to Video Games, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 
196-205 (1982). 
101 For an embittered but humorous view, see Manes, Who'll Think of Suing What Next?, PC 
MAGAZINE, May 26, 1987, at 180-82. Among other things, Manes suggests that recent case law 
supports a hypothetical suit by the estate of Marilyn Monroe against the pop star Madonna. Appar-
ently, Monroe's estate would allege that Madonna has appropriated Monroe's distinctive "total con-
cept and feel." Manes quotes the fictitious spokeswoman for Monroe's estate as saying "As the little 
copycat admits, we are living in a material world." ld. at 180. 
lO' As the reader may be aware, Roth, Krofft, Whelan, and Broderbund have fueled a number 
of controversial "look and feel" copyright claims in computer programs. 
Briefly stated, the "look and feel" of a computer program consists of the design and presentation of 
the software's user interface. When a program is run, information passes between the user and the 
computer via the computer screen and, to a lesser extent, the computer keyboard. Information is given 
to the user via the screen. Information is sent back to the computer via the keyboard. The visual and 
tactile "aura" created by the particular layout of displays and input formats used in the interface 
constitute a program's "look and feel." For example, the particular pattern of screen displays associ-
ated with a common word processing program (such as WordPerfect), along with the commands used 
to operate the program, comprise its "look and feel." See Russo and Derwin, Copyright in the "Look 
and Feel" of Compter Software, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1985, at 1. 
The widespread press coverage given to computer "look and feel" litigation illustrates the tremen-
dous commercial and legal interest in the potential expansion of copyright law. In the most prominent 
of these lawsuits, Apple Computer alleged that Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard infringed Apple's 
copyright in the visual displays associated with its distinctive Macintosh personal computers. Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. and Hewlett-Packard Co. (N.D. Cal. No. C-88-20149). The inter-
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From a conventional view of copyright, the answer to these questions 
would surely be "no." If the idea/expression dichotomy is to have any 
value; it must label the hypothesized similarities as mere similarities of 
idea. Without such a result, copyright would enable the monopolization of 
entire genres of works. The ensuing limits on expression would raise seri-
ous first amendment problems. 
This Article's analysis has shown that, unfortunately, the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy operates solely on instinct. Even worse, in applying this 
instinct the courts have failed to leave us any firm doctrinal guidance as to 
when the idea/expression dichotomy should be used to limit copyright 
claims. Indeed, the doctrine left behind in cases like Roth, Krofft, Whelan, 
and Broderbundl.Ga indicates that no meaningful limits exist. Cases such 
as Blore and McCulloch appear to confirm these suspicions. 
Of course, the lack of any meaningful limit between copyright and the 
first amendment does not necessarily mean that copyright has overstepped 
its constitutional bounds. Perhaps the expression stifled in cases like Roth, 
Krofft, and Blore falls outside the first amendment.1G4 However, as the 
next section will show, Roth-Broderbund's protection of a work's "total 
concept and feel" has a chilling effect on protected speech which is 
troubling. 
est in this case is so intense that it has achieved cover story status in lawyers' magazines and detailed 
coverage in newspapers of general circulation. See Thompson, Is Apple Out on a Limb?, CALIF. 
LAW., Aug. 1988, at 41 (cover story); Schlender, Miller, and Carroll, Apple'S Copyright Lawsuit Is 
Seen As Effort to Lock In Technical Lead, Wall St. j., Mar. 21, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. 4; Waldman, 
Software - Copyright Laws Are in State of Confusion, Wall St. j., Mar. 21,1988, § 2, at 1, col. 4; 
O'Reilly and Sing, ApJIle Files Copyright Suit Against HP and Microsoft, L.A. Times, Mar. 21, 
1988, § 4, at 2; Apple Sues Microsoft, HP Over MacInterface, E.E. Times, Mar. 21, 1988. 
Other widely publicized computer "look and feel" lawsuits include Lotus Development's suit 
against competitors for infringing the famous 1-2-3 spreadsheet and Ashton-Tate's similar suit for 
infringement of its dBASE database programs. See Ashton-Tate Sues Two Firms, Charging Violation 
of dBASE Program COl~yrights, Wall St. j., Nov. 21, 1988, at B4, col. 4; PC MAGAZINE, May 26, 
1987, at 186-97. 
1 •• Roth, Krofft, Whelan, and Broderbund will be collectively referred to as "Roth-
Broderbund." 
1 .. For example, ()ne could argue (albeit weakly) that the Blore television commercials were 
beyond the protection of the first amendment because they were advertisements. Cj. Posadas de Pu-
erto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (allowing the prohibition of 
advertisements for gambling even though gambling was legal in Puerto Rico). 
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IV. A FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA/ExPRESSION 
DICHOTOMY 
The idea/expression dichotomy theoretically limits copyright so that it 
prohibits only copying that is constitutionally valueless.11i1i This limitation, 
however, does not necessarily keep copyright law from running afoul of 
the first amendment, which requires that laws do more than theoretically 
avoid suppressing speech that would contribute to the marketplace of 
ideas. The first amendment further mandates that laws which ostensibly 
suppress only constitutionally valueless speech must not also accidentally 
chill constitutionally valuable speech.11i6 
The Supreme Court's analysis of libel law provides the best known ex-
ample of this first amendment principle.11i7 In a line of famous cases be-
ginning with New York Times v. Sullivan1l56 the Court applied the first 
amendment to limit the scope of libel actions.11i9 Prior to New York Times, 
ordinary state libel law held a defendant strictly liable for all false and 
defamatory16o statements.161 State law also awarded presumed damages to 
100 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
'.8 This requirement has been applied to limit many laws which infringe various types of 
speech, including obscenity, libel, picketing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and advocacy 
of lawless conduct. See Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988) (invalidating a District of Colum-
bia ordinance, which prohibited certain types of picketing within 500 feet of an embassy, the Court 
emphasized the necessity of providing adequate "breathing space" for free speech); Hustler Magazine 
v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988) (applying breathing space analysis to tort action for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress); Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 636, 645, 
vacated and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 254 (1988) (Court discussed "First Amendment chilling effect" in 
relation to the delay caused by seeking a narrowing construction of a statute from a state supreme 
court). See also Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effed', 58 
B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978). 
'.1 The analogy between libel and copyright is quite appropriate. Both causes involve civil ac-
tions brought by private individuals against others who have expressed themselves in some way. 
I •• 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, Sullivan had successfully sued the Times over 
inaccuracies which appeared in a paid newspaper advertisement. !d. at 256. The advertisement, 
which supported the civil rights movement, charged that police had, among other things, assaulted and 
arrested Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. seven times. In fact, Dr. King had been arrested only four 
times. 1d. at 257-59. Sullivan, who was the police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, prevailed 
in the Alabama courts on his claim that the advertisement libelled him. 1d. at 258. The Supreme 
Court reversed. 1d. at 264. 
, •• See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 
U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
180 A statement is defamatory if it "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in 
the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 559 (1977). 
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the successful plaintiff.ls2 This meant that plaintiffs could sometimes re-
cover huge monetary awards without showing any pecuniary harm. ISS 
The New York Times (like other libel defendants) contended that these 
state libel laws unduly suppressed its right of free expression.l64 
The Supreme Court agreed, and stated that the application of strict 
liability and presumed damages created an unacceptable fear of damage 
awards among certain potential libel defendants. lSI> To reduce this chill, 
the Court raised the standards required to support a libel claim. Specifi-
cally, the Court held that so-called "public figures" could not recover libel 
judgments unless they proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
defendants had published the libelous statements with "actual malice.mss 
The Court later held that "private figure" plaintiffs could not recover un-
less they proved that the defendants were "at fault" in publishing the 
defamatory falsehood.ls7 
For purposes of this Article, the salient feature of the Supreme Court's 
libel analysis is that the Court applied the first amendment to libel laws 
even though those laws were aimed only at speech which was false, and 
therefore constitutionally valueless.lS8 This reflected a constitutional judg-
ment that the harm created by the risk of unwarranted libel awards and 
the attendant chilling effect was greater than the harm created by al-
lowing some libel to go unpunished.ls9 By raising the substantive stan-
dards required to support libel claims, the Court created a buffer zone 
protecting constitutionally valuable speech from the uncertain and chilling 
prohibition of the libel laws. Thus, the Court managed to restrict libel's 
161 R. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, § 1.03 (1988). 
162 Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 748 
(1984). 
163 R. SMOLLA, supra note 161, § 9.05. In New York Times, the plaintiff recovered 5500,000. 
376 U.S. at 277-78. 
164 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 262-64. See also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 327. 
16. 376 U.S. at 279. 
166 Id. at 279-80. See also Butts, 388 U.S. at 155. Actual malice meant that the defendant 
published the statement with actual knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the statement's falsity. Id. 
167 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. 
166 The Supreme Court has held that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of 
fact." Id. at 340. 
16. "[Elrroneous statement[sl ... must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 
'breathing space' that they 'need to survive.' " New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72; Schauer, supra 
note 156, at 709-10. 
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chilling effect to constitutionally valueless speech.170 
The following charts, adapted from Professor Schauer's analysis of li-
bel's chilling effect, best illustrate the point: 
true factual 
statement 
intentionally 
false statement 
Speech at the left side of this continuum is considered constitutionally val-
uable, and therefore should be free from libel's chill. Speech on the right-
hand side is constitutionally valueless because it is false, and therefore 
may be prohibited. At some point between these two extremes, a line may 
be drawn separating constitutionally protected speech from constitution-
ally unprotected speech. This line, which separates true and false state-
ments, represents libel's theoretical constitutional limit: 
true factual 
statement 
false 
statements 
theoretical 
constitutional limit 
intentionally 
false statement 
Ideally, courts would be able to fashion a legal rule which accurately em-
bodied this theoretical limit. However, the uncertainty inherent in libel 
caused the traditional prohibition of false statements to actually deter a· 
number of true statements as well. This was libel's chilling effect.l71 To 
reduce the chill, the Supreme Court set libel's actual constitutional limit to 
the right of its theoretical constitutional limit: 
true factual 
statement 
buffer zone 
some false 
statements 
theoretical 
constitutional 
limit 
17. See Schauer, supra note 156, at 705-10. 
intentionally 
false statement 
actual 
constitutional 
limit 
171 See infra notes 173-98 and accompanying text for the method by which copyright chills 
speech. 
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The buffer zone created between libel's actual and theoretical constitu-
tional limits serves to ensure that statements to the left of the theoretical 
limit will not be accidentally deterred or punished. To be sure, the buffer 
zone also allows some false libelous statements to go unpunished, but this 
result merely reflects our constitutional judgment that some evil must be 
tolerated to make sure that all good survives.172 
The analysis of New York Times and the other libel cases points out the 
flaw in the prevailing judicial approach to the conflict between the first 
amendment and copyright. Instead of merely satisfying themselves that 
copyright aims only at constitutionally valueless speech, the courts should 
make sure that the copyright law does not create an unacceptable chilling 
effect. Indeed, the courts' failure to undertake such analysis has allowed 
copyright to create a chilling effect which is fully comparable to that cre-
ated by libel law. This realization springs from a chilling effect analysis of 
the Roth-Brode1·bund line of cases. 
This analysis starts with two basic legal propositions. The first proposi-
tion is that the chilling effect results from the inherent uncertainty of the 
legal system.173 Legal rules are often unclear. Furthermore, the court sys-
tem does not always apply legal rules in a consistent fashion. This uncer-
tainty creates three identifiable fears among individuals. First, they may 
not know if their conduct is illegal. Second, even if they correctly believe 
that their conduct is legal, the system may mistakenly punish them any-
way. Third, even if individuals know that they will vindicate themselves, 
the mere cost of litigation alone creates a fear of what it might cost to 
protect constitutional rights.17• These fears deter individuals from acting. 
The second basic legal proposition underlying this analysis is that while 
uncertainty alone is a constitutional vice,I76 that uncertainty which chills 
172 See Schauer, supra note 156, at 705-10. The same type of buffer zone can be seen in the 
Supreme Court's treatment of obscenity and subversive speech. 1d. at 715-30. 
173 1d. at 688-89. 
17. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971). See also Anderson, Libel 
and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 424-25 (1975). 
170 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (vague statute unconstitutional "based upon 
the potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties" (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of 
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965»); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (unconstitution-
ally vague statute "fails to draw reasonable clear lines" between prohibited conduct and permitted 
conduct); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (Statute prohibiting annoying con-
duct was void for vagueness. "[TJhe ordinance is vague. . . in the sense that no standard of conduct 
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first amendment rights is particularly offensive.176 The first amendment 
requires us to err on the side of protecting free speech. There is a consti-
tutional preference for minimizing interference with free speech, even 
when such minimization might disserve other legitimate government 
goalS.177 
When these principles are applied to the Roth-Broderbund line of 
cases, serious first amendment problems appear. In particular, the "total 
concept and feel" protection adopted by this line of cases creates a first 
amendment chilling effect which has not been addressed by copyright doc-
trine. A comparison of the first amendment implications of libel law and 
"total concept and feel" copyright protection reveals this chill. 
The Supreme Court's libel analysis focused on two sources of the chil-
ling effect. First, there was the defendant's concern that a jury might re-
ject her interpretation of the truth, no matter how careful she had been.178 
Second, the sheer cost of litigating a defamation suit could chill expres-
sion, even if the defendant were certain she would ultimately prevail.179 
Under the Roth-Broderbund line of cases, two analogous sources of 
chill exist. First, there is the uncertainty that a jury might perceive the 
"total concept and feel" of the plaintiff's work differently than the defend-
ant does. Thus, even if the defendant genuinely believed that she had not 
copied the plaintiff's protectable "concept and feel," the defendant would 
still have to worry about the perceptions of the jury. Second, the cost of 
litigating a copyright suit could be overly burdensome, as was the cost of 
litigating a defamation suit. Further examination reveals that the size of 
copyright's chill is completely comparable to, if not greater than, libel's 
chill. 
To make the easy comparison first, the cost of modern litigation is con-
is specified at all."). 
176 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (vagueness a particular vice "in the area of 
First Amendment freedoms"). 
171 Of course, this preference does not afford absolute protection for all speech interests. If it did 
there would be no libel or copyright laws. Instead, the preference reflects a "tipping of the scales" in 
favor of speakers. See Schauer, supra note 156, at 701-05, 709-10 ("[A]cknowledgement of the inevi-
tability of error and the priority of one type of error mandates that any such balancing process be 
heavily weighted in favor of the constitutional interest."). 
178 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279; Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50. 
179 See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52-53. See also Anderson, supra note 174, at 424-25. 
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siderable, no matter what the subject matter of the suit.lsO Thus, the chil-
ling effect which arises from the cost of defending one's rights is equal in 
both contexts. More importantly, the risk of disagreement between the 
perceptions of jury and defendant seems greater in the case of "total con-
cept and feel" than it does in the case of libel. Thus, the uncertainty faced 
by prospective copyright defendants is even worse than that faced by pro-
spective libel defendants. 
In libel, the jury considers the issue of truth. Although the question of 
what constitutes truth is a hotly debated philosophical topic, "truth" is a 
concept which has an everyday meaning. Average jurors (and defendants) 
regularly deal with the concept of truth. Human experience furnishes a 
common basis for deciding whether a defamatory statement is true or 
false. Thus, even though uncertainty over the truth of a statement still 
exists, a prospective libel defendant at least understands the nature of the 
determination a libel jury will make. 
By contrast, jurors and litigants involved in a "total concept and feel" 
copyright case will never have confronted this notion before. Thus, the 
defendant will have no idea whether what she perceives as being the "to-
tal concept and feel" of the plaintiff's work will also be what the jury 
perceives is the "total concept and feel." The courts' failure to even define 
"total concept and feel" aggravates this problem. Even the court itself may 
not know the fundamental issue on which the case turns. Since there is no 
180 Apple Computer's first "look and feel" copyright lawsuit, which was settled in Apple's favor, 
provides a good example of the chill caused by legal expenses. In 1984, a company called Digital 
Research, Inc. authored a program which incorporated many of the user-friendly features popularized 
by Apple's Macintosh computers. Apple sued, claiming that Digital Research had appropriated Ap-
ple's "look and feel." Reportedly, Digital Research settled on terms favorable to Apple largely because 
it could not alford the millions of dollars necessary to litigate the case. Thompson, supra note 152, at 
47. 
The willingness of aggressive litigants to use the cost of litigation as a weapon against innocent 
defendants is further illustrated in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). In that case, Universal attempted to enjoin Nintendo from selling its popular Don-
key Kong video game. Id. at 840. Prior to filing suit, Universal had attempted to extract royalties from 
Nintendo on the ground that the Donkey Kong game (which involved an ape holding a woman cap-
tive) violated Universal's rights in King Kong. [d. at 840, 854-55. Among other things, Universal 
threatened Nintendo by asserting that its litigation department was a profit center for the company, 
and th'at Nintendo should start saving its money for legal fees. [d. at 841. Universal lost on summary 
judgment, and the court ultimately held that Universal had brought its suit in bad faith. [d. at 842, 
863. For a brief analysis of the chill created by the cost of litigating copyright claims, see Kulzick and 
Hogue, supra note 102, at 71. 
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common basis for deciding what the "total concept and feel" of a work is, 
let alone what it means for two works to have substantially the same "to-
tal concept and feel," a prospective copyright defendant in a case like 
Krofft will have absolutely no idea whether she will win or lose an m-
fringement case. lSI 
In the context of widely disseminated works like H. R. PufnstuJ, this 
creates a powerful chill. H. R. Pufnstuf was the most popular children's 
show on Saturday morning television.ls2 It seems fair to assume that prac-
tically anyone in the television business would have seen the show at one 
time or another. If one of these hypothetical viewers ever decided to create 
a series based upon a fantasyland inhabited by fanciful characters, the 
authors of Pufnstuf would probably be able to state a plausible copyright 
claim against the new show, based upon the decision in Krofft. Indeed, 
Blore's extension of stylistic protection makes it impossible for the second 
author to avoid liability if sued. ISS In light of such a threat, it would not 
be surprising if a number of future authors never proceeded with their 
projects.lS4 
181 Even those suggesting the propriety of "look and feel" protection for computer programs 
admit the subjectivity inherent in "look and fee!." Russo and Derwin, supra note 152, at 11 nA ("We 
recognize that, even as amplified by the foregoing, the term 'lpok and feel' remains somewhat impre-
cise and subjective."). 
182 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1166. 
183 Imagine our hypothetical author going to his lawyer to get an opinion of non infringement for 
purposes of preparing a prospectus for investors in the show! Even worse, many copyright holders are 
well aware of the preclusive power of the mere threat of a copyright suit, and are ready and willing to 
aggressively use copyright to gain competitive advantages over commercial rivals: 
American industry in general, and high-technology companies in particular, are increas-
ingly resorting to patent and copyright litigation as a source of new revenue and as a 
competitive weapon. Companies are viewing such intellectual property rights as key corpo-
rate assets to be exploited to the fullest in an increasingly competitive environment .... 
"You're seeing the aggressive use of intellectual property rights as a sword," said [a leading 
practitioner]. [Another stated], "If you have good patents, litigation is a better way of mak-
ing money than selling products." 
Pollack, The New High-Tech Battleground, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1988, § 3, at 1. 
In reference to Apple Computer's aggressive use of copyright litigation to maintain its competitive 
edge over rivals, one article quoted the publisher of a computer industry newsletter as saying, "Ag-
gressiveness is extraordinarily necessary in this industry . . . Apple executives would be extremely 
derelict in their duty to their shareholders if they didn't try to use every means available to protect 
what is theirs." Thompson, supra note 152, at 43. 
18' Schauer's general description of how vagueness deters speech illustrates the chilling effect of 
"total concept and feel" copyright protection: 
If the terms of a statute or the concepts underlying a common-law principle are so amor-
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Krofft's first amendment problems are matched by those created by 
Roth. Like H. R. Pufnstuf, popular greeting cards are widely known 
among the public. No experienced card artist can plausibly claim not to 
have seen popular lines of greeting cards such as those designed by Boyn-
ton or Schultz. This means that a designer who intends to create cards to 
compete with these industry giants could not defeat a copyright suit by 
claiming that she had never seen the original. More importantly, a de-
signer could go crazy trying to decide if her cards avoided the same moods 
captured in other cards. 
The foregoing analysis clearly demonstrates that Roth and Krofft's "to-
tal concept and feel" protection creates at least as much uncertainty 
among potential defendants as did unfettered common law libel. Under 
the reasoning of New York Times and other chilling effect cases, this un-
certainty creates an unconstitutional chill against speech unless a clear 
buffer zone exists between protected speech and prohibited copying. To 
put it another way, "total concept and feel" protection is unconstitutional 
unless copyright doctrine contains a meaningful limit on how far such 
protection can go. This limit would prevent copyright from deterring the 
very speech it was meant to encourage. 
Again, an adaptation of Schauer's charts best demonstrates the point. 
Works which borrow only ideas (i.e. are only superficially similar to other 
phous as to create no crystalized view of what precise conduct is being regulated, an indi-
vidual may be quite unsure whether his intended behavior is proscribed until after he has 
acted. Indeed, so:ne legal concepts and language may 'be so incapable of precise definition 
and application that any real degree of certainty is unattainable. Therefore, when a vague 
regulatory rule h added to factors previously mentioned, the amount of overall uncertainty 
is increased, with a corresponding increase in fear; the ultimate result is a heightened 
probability of deterrence. 
Schauer, supra note 156, at 698-99. See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, § 16.9, at 846 (3d ed. 1986): 
To the extent that the law is vague and relates to fundamental constitutional rights, it 
might have an 'in terrorem' effect and deter persons from engaging in activities, such as 
constitutionally protected speech, th~t are of particular constitutional importance. In other 
words, an unclear law regulating speech might deter or chill persons from engaging in 
speech or activit} with special protection under the Constitution. 
See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) ("Those ... sensitive to the perils posed by ... 
indefinite language, avoid the risk ... only by restricting their conduct to that which is unquestion-
ably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited."). 
In light of the well documented vagueness inherent in the idea/expression dichotomy and "total 
concept and feel" prmection, it is hard to imagine better descriptions of how copyright can deter 
expression. 
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works) are constitutionally protected and occupy the left side of the chart. 
By contrast, works which borrow expresssion (Le. are literally similar to 
other works) are constitutionally valueless and occupy the right side of the 
chart. Copyright's theoretical constitutional limit exists in the middle: 
superficial 
similarity 
theoretical 
constitutional limit 
literal 
similarity 
Like libel, copyright in a work's "total concept and feel" poses a chilling 
effect problem by deterring the creation of new works which bear even 
superficial similarity to prior copyrighted works.181> This creates an un-
constitutional infringement of speech unless some limit exists to the right 
of copyright's theoretical limit:186 
superficial 
similarity 
buffer 
zone 
theoretical 
constitutional 
limit 
constitutionally 
necessary 
limit 
literal 
similarity 
This Article's prior analysis of Roth and Krofft showed how such a 
limit could have been provided by a strong vision of idea.187 However, 
cases like Whelan and Broderbund failed to provide the required vision. 
Instead, those cases adopted such a weak view of idea that no meaningful 
limit on copyright's scope could be found.188 The bizarre result reached in 
18. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra notes 117-53 and accompanying text. In tenns of Schauer's charts, this result is 
expressed by placing copyright's apparent doctrinal limit well to the left of the theoretical constitu-
tional limit: 
superficial 
similarity 
apparent 
doctrinal 
limit 
buffer 
zone 
theoretical 
constitutional 
limit 
constitutionally 
necessary 
limit 
literal 
similarity 
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Blore further demonstrated the courts' general inability to appreciate the 
first amendment implications of "total concept and feel" copyright protec-
tion. Together, these cases signal the absence of the constitutionally re-
quired buffer zone.189 
The stifling effect of this absence is illustrated by the tremendous 
problems facing the modern software industry.19o Presently, computer 
189 The same result also flows from consideration of Nimmer's assertion that the idea/expression 
dichotomy provides an acceptable definitional balance of first amendment and copyright goals. Under 
a proper definitional balance, the limiting concept of idea would have enough weight to give future 
authors an opportunity to write without fear of copyright suits. Roth-Broderbund destroyed this bal-
ance. Whelan and Broderbund's adoption of a very weak conception of idea allows Roth and Krofft's 
expanded view of expression to decisively tilt Nimmer's hypothetical balance to the side of copyright. 
Future authors have little or no room in which ~o write without fear of copyright suits. See supra 
notes 18 and 107. 
19. Although it may not be immediately apparent, computer programming is speech protected by 
the first amendment. Courts have consistently held that the first amendment guarantees freedom of 
expression. See supra note 5. Since copyright itself protects only original "expression," the first 
amendment logically applies to all works within copyright's reach. Computer programming's first 
amendment implications become even clearer when one examines its communicative and expressive 
aspects. 
First of all, computer programs communicate information to other programmers. As the Office of 
Technology Assessment noted, "Like other copyrightable works, programs symbolize information to 
human beings, and can be read and understood by programmers. The CONTU report stressed that 
programs, like other copyrightable works, communicate to those who can read them." OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND 
INFORMATION 80 (1986). Since the first amendment protects an individual's right to communicate 
with others, it must protect a computer programmer's right to communicate with others in her special 
language. Cj. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (first amendment rights "not confined 
to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action ... "). 
This communication function can be illustrated via a program which makes a computer add the 
numbers 3 and 4 and then display the result on the screen. Such a program would look something like 
this; 
x=3+4 
print ("The sum of 3 + 4 = ", x) 
When read by a human who understands the computer language in which it is written, the pro-
gram communicates a method by which the sum of 3 + 4 may be computed and displayed by a 
computer. Just as a mathematics text or written music communicates to a specially trained group of 
readers, a computer program communicates to its own group of readers. When seen in this light, the 
first amendment implications of computer programs are no different from those of many other copy-
rightable texts. 
Second, when a program is run by the computer, the resulting displays are themselves works of 
authorship which conv.:y information to users. For example, the display generated by the simple 
program above would be "The sum of 3 + 4 = 7." Furthermore, many computer screen displays 
contain further instructions about how to operate the program being run. See Broderbund, 648 F. 
Supp. at 1134. Both components of screen displays are certainly protected by the first amendment. 
Finally, courts have c:onsistently held that the visual displays generated by computer programs are 
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programmers who want to avoid duplicating the "total concept and feel" 
of other programs face tremendous uncertainty in figuring out just what it 
is they should try to avoid copying. Under present copyright doctrine, 
these programmers are permitted to identify a work's ideas, and restrict 
their copying to those ideas. However, when these prospective defendants 
read Whelan and Broderbund, they find a conception of idea so weak as 
to be nearly meaningless. The weak notion of idea would be further rein-
forced if our prospective defendant ran across the McCulloch or Blore 
opinions' strange characterizations of idea.I91 
In particular, the Whelan rule forces authors to logically conclude that 
they can borrow only a program's purpose. Nothing else can be borrowed, 
no matter how vague or general. This interpretation has stifled innova-
tion, as programmers decide not to create new programs for fear of being 
sued.I92 From a first amendment point of view, the decreased flow of new 
programs shows that copyright has in fact chilled the very speech that it 
was meant to encourage. 
Additional examination of Krofft and Whelan further illustrates the 
causal connection between the courts' lack of constitutional vigilance and 
copyrightable because they contain significant creative expression. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1134 
("The menu screens in 'Print Shop' contain much more than just instructions on how to operate the 
program. Their artwork is aesthetically pleasing. Their layout and sequence, viewed as part of a total 
user interface, provides a significant element of entertainment for the user."); Softklone, 659 F. Supp. 
at 463 ("The specific placement, arrangement and design of the parameter/command terms on the 
status screen is neither arbitrary nor predetermined but, rather, is the result of extensive original 
human authorship."). Artistic expression and entertainment have both long been protected by the first 
amendment. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (first amendment held to protect 
nude dancing); Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 231, reh'g denied, 433 U.S. 915 
(1977) ("But our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, eco-
nomic, literary or ethical matters ... is not entitled to full First Amendment protection."); Kingsley 
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (first 
amendment protects distribution of the film Lady Chatterley'S Lover). 
191 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text. 
19' Statements of industry leaders and observers document the chill created by aggressive copy-
right claims: 
"Look-and-feel lawsuits are already impacting product development. And because hardware and 
sofware development takes so long, the uncertainty brought on ... will affect the products we see for 
up to 3 )·ears. Some of this effect will be irreversible." PC MAGAZINE, May 26,1987, at 169 (empha-
sis added) (quoting Dan Bricklin, developer of the VisiCalc spreadsheet program). Bricklin's real life 
observations correspond closely to Schauer's description of how uncertainty creates a constitutionally 
objectionable chill. See supra note 184. 
"After a while, Apple's lawyers didn't have to bother to sue. Rumors of suits were sufficient to 
scare off would-be competitors." Thompson, supra note 152, at 47. 
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the above-demonstrated problems of copyright law. In Krofft the court 
rejected the defendants' argument that the first amendment limited the 
scope of protection for the plaintiffs' work.19S In so deciding, the court 
remained true to the prevailing view that copyright raises no first amend-
ment problems.194 Similarly, in Whelan the court failed to heed the de-
fendant's warning that adoption of the court's rule for separating idea 
from expression would render copyright law improperly vague.191! These 
decisions wrongly removed constitutional values from the application of 
the idea/expression dichotomy. 
In Krofft the court adopted a dangerously vague view of copyrightable 
expression without even considering the effect this decision would have on 
future authors. Such considerations would have been at the heart of any 
analysis truly cognizant of first amendment values.19s In Whelan the court 
used economic policy to justify its decision.197 By doing this, the court 
overlooked the fact that first amendment principles guaranteeing civil 
rights are superior to the economic policies that it perceived as underlying 
the copyright law.19s Even if Roth-Broderbund's amorphous and expan-
sive brand of copyright is good economic policy, the Constitution places 
limits on the chilling effect that can accompany such policy. 
The above analysis demonstrates that the courts' failure to heed first 
amendment values has allowed copyright to unduly chill basic rights of 
expression. In light of the first amendment's supremacy over copyright, 
19' Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1169-71. 
194 The court wrote: "[T]he idea· expression dichotomy already serves to accommodate the com-
peting interests of copyright and the first amendment." [d. at 1170. 
19. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237-38. It should be noted that this argument was not raised in a 
constitutional context. Nevertheless, the court should have been cognizant of the first amendment im-
plications behind any vagueness argument involving copyright. 
19. The analysis of copyright's chilling effect relies on ~sessing the impact of the law on pro-
spective defendants. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text. 
1117 797 F.2d at 1237-38 ("[I]t is surely true that limiting copyright protection ... would yield 
more definite answers than does our answer here. Ease of application is not, however, a sufficient 
counterweight to the [economic] considerations we have adduced on behalf of our position."). Another 
example of willingness to overlook vagueness in order to accomplish economic goals is provided by 
Russo and Derwin, supra note 152, at 11 n.4: "We recognize that, even as amplified by the foregoing, 
the term 'look and feel' remains somewhat imprecise and subjective. That may be necessary if protec-
tion is to be extended beyond actual programming to the specific manner in which software communi-
cates with users." 
19. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1180-82 for a discussion of the first amendment's superiority 
over copyright law. 
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the courts must begin limiting the Roth-Broderbund trend before it irre-
versibly pushes copyright beyond its first amendment limits. The conclu-
sion of this Article will suggest some ways in which this might be 
accomplished. 
v. CONCLUSION 
This Article set out to test the validity of the courts' assumption that 
mere application of the idea/expression dichotomy keeps the copyright 
law within its first amendment limitations. To accomplish this, the Article 
first examined the nature of the principal conceptual limit on the expan-
sion of copyright, the idea/expression dichotomy. The examination re-
vealed that the idea/expression dichotomy is at best a very amorphous 
distinction, one which plausibly may be construed to imply either an ex-
tremely broad scope of copyright protection or a very narrow one. 
Next, the Article noted that a recent line of cases signalled a disman-
tling of the idea/expression dichotomy's ability to limit the unwarranted 
expansion of copyright law. Cases like Roth and Krofft started this trend 
by treating vague and general features of works as copyrightable expres-
sion. By defining features like "total concept and feel" to be expression 
and not idea, these cases made it easier for plaintiffs to state broader and 
broader claims of copyright. Fortunately, for a time courts used a common 
sense application of the idea/expression dichotomy to prevent a total ex-
pansion of copyright to its broadest conceivable limits. 
Unfortunately, when courts tried to apply Roth and Krofft in the unfa-
miliar context of computer programs, the instinctive process of applying 
the idea/expression dichotomy broke down. Cases like Whelan and 
Broderbund adopted the most limited conception of idea imaginable. By 
restricting a computer program's unprotected idea to its "purpose or func-
tion," the courts implied that practically any similarities between two 
works could furnish the basis for a copyright infringement claim. Even 
worse, cases such as Blore proved that the combination of "total concept 
and feel" protection and an extremely limited notion of unprotected idea 
could quickly lead to bizarre results. 
Working from the hypothesis that Roth-Broderbund might have 
pushed copyright beyond its constitutional limits, the Article next evalu-
ated that line of cases in light of its first amendment chilling effect. The 
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Article found that the uncertainty which surrounds "total concept and 
feel" protection created a chilling effect which was greater than the chill 
created by common law libel, and that the toothless notion of idea adopted 
by the Whelan and Broderbund courts failed to create the constitutionally 
necessary buffer zone between copyright and protected speech. 
These observations led to the conclusion that the courts were in fact 
mistaken in ignoring the first amendment implications of copyright law. 
Indeed, this mistake made the chilling effect of Roth-Broderbund possible. 
To correct this error, the courts must now abandon their belief that the 
idea/expression dichotomy alone can keep copyright from running afoul 
of the first amendment. This change should eliminate the chilling effect 
which was created by Roth-Broderbund. 
This reversal might be accomplished in part by reinvigorating the ideal 
expression dichotomy, thereby expanding the scope of a work's ideas and 
limiting the scope of its expressions. In particular, the chill created by the 
amorphous notion of a work's "total concept and feel" suggests that courts 
should either eliminate "total concept and feel" copyright claims or re-
quire fairly extensive literal similarity before considering such claims. At 
the very least, the courts must find some way to concretely define what 
"total concept and feel" is. Such developments would undoubtedly do 
much to bring copyright law back within its first amendment limits. 
However, while a reinvigorated idea/expression dichotomy certainly 
will play an important role in the reform of copyright, that concept is one 
whose unprincipled nature has caused problems in the past. Specifically, 
that concept failed not only because the courts did not enforce it diligently, 
but also because the very process of separating idea from expression 
proved elusive and unsatisfying. For this reason, the reinvigorated use of 
the idea/expression dichotomy alone may never produce an acceptable 
limit on copyright law. Indeed, if courts continue their instinctive method 
of trying to separate idea from expression, they risk recreating the old 
constitutionally suspect lines of cases like Roth-Broderbund. 
In light of this, the courts should also look to other areas of copyright 
doctrine in their struggle to keep copyright within its constitutional limits. 
For example, raising the burden of proof required in copyright cases 
might have the effect of reducing the chill cast by overly aggressive copy-
HeinOnline -- 38 Emory L. J.  435 1989
1989] IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY 435 
right plaintiffs.199 Similarly, a quick consideration of copyright's require-
ment of originality suggests that increased attention to this topic might 
effectively limit copyright in a more principled manner than does the 
idea/expression dichotomy.2oo Lastly, Congress should look into the possi-
bility of legislative reform. Modifications of the copyright statute might go 
far in reducing the uncertain nature of many copyright concepts. 
In the final analysis, it is not clear whether the doctrine that ultimately 
will reconcile copyright law with the first amendment is the ideal expres-
sion dichotomy, originality, or some other concept. However, the one thing 
that is certain is that copyright law has clearly begun to exceed its consti-
tutional boundaries. If this trend is not decisively checked by the courts, 
then the conflict between copyright and its first amendment limits may 
become as problematic as the analogous conflict between libel and the first 
amendment. The controversy which surrounds modern libel law, particu-
larly the many constitutional requirements laid on top of libel doctrine, 
ought to convince the courts that copyright law should be repaired before 
complicated constitutional defenses to copyright actions become neces-
, •• Indeed, the Supreme Court reduced libel's chilling effect by raising the burden of proof to be 
carried by libel plaintiffs. See Schauer, supra note 156, at 708-09. 
200 The suggested quick consideration might run something like this: The section 102(a) require-
ment of originality means that authors cannot maintain copyright in facets of their work which were 
copied from prior works or the public domain. NIMMER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 2.01, at 2-8. 
Since all authors owe heavy creative debts to those who have worked before them, it seems that a 
vigorous application of originality would limit the scope of many broad copyright claims. Cf Gold-
stein, supra note 9, at 1020-22. 
Although the originality requirement is not a substitute for the idea/expression dichotomy, its pro-
cess of comparison with other works offers distinct advantages over the idea/expression dichotomy 
from a first amendment point of view. On the one hand, the idea/expression dichotomy relies heavily 
on an elusive ad hoc distinction between a work's idea and its expression. See supra notes 65-66 and 
accompanying text. The previously demonstrated uncertainty in predicting the outcome of this ad hoc 
process contributes greatly to the idea/expression dichotomy's constitutionally objectionable chilling 
effect. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. 
On the other hand, the originality doctrine avoids this problem to a large extent by not operating in 
the vacuum created by ad hoc appraisals of works. Instead of guessing whether intended borrowing 
involves idea or expression, prospective authors can decide whether or not they are entitled to borrow 
a facet of a prior work by comparing that prior work with even earlier works. If the particular facet 
to be borrowed appears in a number of earlier works, then the prospective author gains comfort that 
her contemplated action will not take the intellectual property of another, but instead will borrow 
from material already in the public domain. This type of analysis yields results that are much more 
concrete than those produced by the abstract struggle to separate idea from expression. Therefore, 
prospective authors confront less uncertainty under an originality regime than under an ideal expres-
sion regime, and consequently there is less of a constitutionally problematic chilling effect. 
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sary.201 For this reason, courts and commentators alike must immediately 
begin reinterpreting the copyright law so that it will stay within its first 
amendment boundaries. Without such an effort, we all risk the unwar-
ranted suppression of precious rights of expression . 
• 01 For a recent summary of some of the controversy surrounding modern libel law, see Yen, It's 
Not That Simple: An Unnecessary Elimination of Strict Liability and Presumed Damages in Libel 
Law, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 593 (1988). 
